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IN RE FRANKLIN-THE COMMITMENT AND
RELEASE OF PERSONS ACQUITTED BY
REASON OF INSANITY
A defendant acquitted by reason of insanity does not usually
walk out of the courtroom as a free individual. In many states such
as California, an acquittal by reason of insanity often means that
the defendant will subsequently be committed to a mental hospital.'
Section 1026 of the California Penal Code provides that a defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity shall be committed to a state
hospital, unless the court finds he has fully recovered his sanity. If
the court does so find, he is remanded to the sheriffs custody to have
his sanity determined by civil proceedings. Once committed, the defendant may not be released until the court, after notice and a hearing, has determined his sanity has been fully restored.2 In order to
obtain his release the committed defendant proceeds under section
1026a which requires him to apply to the court for a hearing, but
which further prohibits any hearing before 90 days has elapsed from
the date he was ordered committed. If his hearing fails he may not
file another application for a hearing until a year has passed since his
last hearing. Section 1026a further provides that in all such hearings he bears the burden of proving he has regained his sanity.3
1. Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the
Equal Protectionof the Laws, 116 U. PA. L. RPv. 924 nn. 1-3 (1968).
2. Section 1026 provides: "If the verdict or finding be that the defendant was
insane at the time the offense was committed, the court unless it shall appear to the
court that the defendant has fully recovered his sanity shall direct that the defendant
be confined in the State hospital for the criminal insane, or if there be no such State
hospital, then that he be confined in some other State hospital for the insane. If,
however, it shall appear to the court that the defendant has fully recovered his sanity
such defendant shall be remanded to the custody of the sheriff until his sanity shall
have been finally determined in the manner prescribed by law. A defendant committed to a State hospital shall not be released from confinement unless and until the
court which committed him, or the superior court of the county in which he is confined, shall, after notice and a hearing, find and determine that his sanity has been restored." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
3. Section 1026a provides: "An application for the release of a person who has
been committed to a state hospital, as provided in Section 1026, upon the ground that
his sanity has been restored, may be made to the superior court of the county in which
he is confined or of the county from which he was committed, either by such person or
by the superintendent of the hospital in which the said person is confined. No hearing
upon such application shall be allowed until the person committed shall have been con-
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While the California provisions on commitment and release are
comparable to most other state provisions,4 these procedures remain
controversial and have often been attacked as repugnant to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the constitution.' Since the
acquittal by reason of insanity only reflects a finding that the defendant was legally insane at the time he committed the act charged, 6 the
absence of a hearing on his present sanity is challenged as a denial
of due process. The second argument often made is that depriving
persons criminally committed of the procedural safeguards routinely
afforded to persons civilly committed7 amounts to a denial of equal
protection.
The California Supreme Court in In re Franklin8 recently upheld
sections 1026 and 1026a against these due process and equal protection attacks. Petitioner, Robert Guy Franklin had been convicted of
making false bomb reports, found not guilty by reason of insanity'
and ordered committed to the state hospital pursuant to section 1026.
This note will scrutinize the court's treatment of commitment and release, highlighting some of the less clearly expressed, but fundamental
considerations in the area of the commitment and release of defendants
acquitted by reason of insanity. The note will conclude with an examination of two questions not considered by the Franklin court:
(1) does the statutory procedure for seeking release sufficiently protect the defendant's rights, and (2) is habeas corpus available as a
current means to seek release?
fined for a period of not less than 90 days from the date of the order of commitment.
If the finding of the court be adverse to releasing such person upon his application for
release, on the ground that his sanity has not been restored, he shall not be permitted to file a further application until one year has elapsed from the date of hearing
upon his last preceding application. In any hearing authorized by this section the
burden of proving that his sanity has been restored shall be upon the applicant. CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1026a (West 1970).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4702(a) (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-301(d) (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (1965).
5. See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mills v. State,
256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1968); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971).
6. The presumption that insanity proved to have existed in the past continues to
the present in order to justify commitment is discussed in the text accompanying notes
89-111 infra.
7. See note 56 infra.
8. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
9. The question of insanity was submitted upon the reports by two courtappointed psychiatrists. One, Dr. Deering, concluded that although the defendant was
deeply depressed, intoxicated and in a panic state at the time of the alleged offense, he
was then legally sane under the M'Naghten test. Brief for Respondent, Exhibit 7,
In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
The other
psychiatrist, Dr. Bailey, concluded that he was legally insane at the time of the alleged offense and that he had not recovered his sanity and continued to be a menace
to the health and safety of others. Id., Exhibit 6.
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The Constitutional Validity of Provisions for
Initial Commitment Prior to a Hearing
The Equal Protection Attack
There are few areas of law about which more has been written
and less has been settled than the area of criminal commitment to mental institutions.' 0 Lawyers and psychiatrists disagree in defining insanity and in determining its application to criminal law. The lack of
psychiatric certainty in this area precludes any present settlement of
the dispute." This lack of agreement requires that procedures for
criminal commitment and release be thoroughly examined so that they
may strike an enlightened balance between psychiatric knowledge and
legal policy. This balance is nowhere more dramatically struck than
in the area of equal protection.
Franklin contended that the equal protection clause demanded
that he be afforded the legal rights and procedural safeguards which

were routinely afforded those persons civilly committed to mental institutions.:" Yet he had been found by a preponderance of the evidence to have been insane when he committed a criminal offense, and
the court felt that this was a rational basis for treating him differently

than persons civilly committed.'

3

The Special Public Interest in Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity
The court's basis of sanctioning this difference in treatment between the civilly and criminally committed is the special interest in
the confinement of the defendant which the public acquires upon his
10. See, e.g., Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 4 HARV. J. LEGos. 55 (1966); Krash, The Durham Rule and
Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE
L.J. 905 (1961); Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849 (1960); Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following
a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409 (1961); Comment, Commitment
Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Laws,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 924 (1968).
11. See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465,
101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972): "If allegedly mentally ill persons for whom involuntary
confinement is sought on the civil side are entitled by statute to a trial by jury on the
question of whether the jurisdictional prerequisites formulated by the legislature are
satisfied [CAL. WrLF. & INST'NS CODE §§5303, 5304 (imminently dangerous persons); id. §§ 5230, 5350, 5361 (gravely disabled persons) (West 1972)] even
though such commitments are far shorter in duration than the potentially lifetime confinement Penal Code section 1026 permits, yet are subject to periodic reevaluation,
surely the equal protection clause demands that a like penumba [sic] of rights be
offered persons in petitioner's situation."
13. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 133-34, 496 P.2d 465, 468-69, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 556-57 (1972).
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acquittal by reason of insanity. 4 Adopting the reasoning of the recent Maine Supreme Court case of Chase v. Kearns, 5 the Franklin court
held:
[T]he finding by the jury that a defendant, because of his mental disease or defect, shall be held blameless for an act otherwise
subject to criminal sanctions puts such a defendant into an exceptional class. The special interest which the public has acquired in the confinement and release of people in this exceptional class results from the fact that there has been a judicial
determination that they have already endangered the public safety
and their own as a result of their mental conditions as distinguished
from people civilly committed because of only potential danger.
We hold that the distinction in commitment and release applying to Petitioner, as a member of this exceptional class, is a
reasonable requirement for the protection of the Petitioner and of
the public interest.' 6
The Chase court, following this reasoning, concluded that no
17
hearing was constitutionally required prior to a criminal commitment.
While Franklin in his petition relied heavily upon two cases'" which
had required a hearing prior to criminal commitment, neither case
held that such a hearing was constitutionally required.' 9 In fact, one
case cited by Franklin held: "We see no reason why a man who has
himself asserted that he was insane at the time the crime was committed and has convinced the jury thereof should not in his own interest and for the protection of the public be forthwith committed for
14. Id. at 138, 496 P.2d at 472, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
15. 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971). Chase involved a similar constitutional attack.
under the due process and equal protection clauses, on Maine's statutory provision for
the disposition of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 103 (1965). This section provides that following a verdict of acquittal by reason of
insanity the defendant shall be automatically committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, and then placed in an appropriate institution.
Id.

16. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 138, 496 P.2d 465, 472, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
560 (1972), quoting from Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971) (emphasis
added by California Supreme Court).
17. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 139 (Me. 1971).
18. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Lally, 19
N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
19. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Lally, 19
N.Y.2d 27, 34, 224 N.E.2d 87, 91-92, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 659 (1966).
In Bolton
the court noted that the statute in question can survive constitutional attack. "Rigid
application of the equal protection doctrine might suggest that [D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301 (1967)] Subsection (d) be wholly supplanted by the Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act. But a reasonable application permits Subsection (d) to treat persons
acquitted by reason of insanity differently from civilly committed persons to the extent
that there are relevant differences between these two groups." 395 F.2d at 651. For
the holding in Lally see the text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
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'20 This view is foldetention, examination and report as to his sanity.
21
lowed by the majority of the courts, yet no case has adequately explored the basis of this special public interest, even though there is a
strong trend towards adopting this doctrine.12
Statutes which provide for the automatic commitment of a de-

fendant following his acquittal by reason of insanity reflect a balancing of individual and social interests. The individual should be free
from any unjustified deprivation of liberty while society should be
protected from dangerous individuals. 23 An enlightened balance can
only be struck when all the interacting forces which underlie the special
public interest argument are clearly understood. 4

The first, and apparently most important basis of the special
public interest in the confinement and release of persons acquitted by

reason of insanity is their potential dangerousness. 25

"Because of

20. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 33, 224 N.E.2d 87, 91, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654,
659. Substantially the same reason is stated by the Bolton court. See 395 F.2d at 651.
21. E.g., Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752, 755-56 (Del. 1968); Chase v. Kearns,
278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971); State v. Shackford, 262 A.2d 359, 366 (Me. 1970);
People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 162-63, 117 N.Y.S. 322,
324-25, aff'd, 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 1109 (1909); Newton v. Brooks, 246 Ore. 484,
489-90, 426 P.2d 446, 449 (1967); State ex rel. Schopf v. Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644,
651-52, 173 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1970).
22. The first case to label this policy of protection of the public interest a
"special public interest" was State v. Shackford, 262 A.2d 359, 366 (Me. 1970). In
the two years which have followed that decision, in four major decisions by the highest
courts of four jurisdictions, three fnew courts have adopted, and Maine has reaffirmed
that language and reasoning. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 133-34, 496 P.2d 465,
468-69, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556-57 (1972); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me.
1971); State v. Taylor, 491 P.2d 877, 881 (Mont. 1971); State v. Blubaugh, 80 Wash.
2d 28, 491 P.2d 646, 649-50 (1971).
23. For example, the stated purpose of the provisions for commitment following
acquittal by reason of insanity in the District of Columbia (D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301
(1967) ) is to "achieve a balance of interest between the public and the person
charged with the crime." The Congressional committees which proposed the statute
thought that "a mandatory commitment statute would add much to the public's peace
of mind and to the public safety, without impairing the rights of the accused."
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting from S. RP. No.
1170, H.R. REP.No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, 3, 16 (1955).
24. "Ultimately, if circularity of reasoning is to be avoided, many of the problems raised by this analysis of the decision to release persons acquitted by reason of
insanity can only be resolved following a detailed re-examination of the function of the
doctrine of criminal responsibility. The need for such a fundamental study is highlighted by what appears to be a fruitless and frustrating debate among and between
lawyers and psychiatrists in search of a formula for insanity as a defense." Goldstein
& Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness. Some Observations on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALLE L.J. 225, 239 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein & Katz]. The issue of criminal responsibility is later
raised and briefly discussed. See text accompanying notes 36-46 supra.
25. Dangerousness is not only a stated basis for initial commitment, it is also
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the potentialities of people in this exceptional class for further conduct
injurious to themselves or others, society acquires a special interest in
such persons justifying the careful determination whether such persons require custody and treatment to avoid danger to themselves or
others due to mental disease or mental defect. '2 6 This has often
been the articulated rationale for the enactment of automatic or discretionary commitment statutes. 7 When advancing this argument
many courts have pointed out that an acquittal by reason of insanity
presupposes a judicial determination that the defendant did in fact
commit the act charged which would otherwise be criminal. 28 Thus,
unlike persons who are subjected to civil commitment procedures because of potential dangerousness, the person who is acquitted by reason of insanity "has demonstrated an ability, not merely a propensity,
to commit dangerous acts." 29
Although this argument is based on the assumption that the defendant acquitted by reason of insanity is demonstrably more dangerous than persons civilly committed, the factual issue of their relative dangerousness is actually far from resolved. Professor Weihofen, a noted authority in the field, frankly disagrees with this position: "Insofar as our fear that 'criminally insane' patients may escape has a rational as distinguished from a merely emotional basis, it
rests on the assumption that such persons are more dangerous than
other mental hospital inmates. The evidence, however, is that this
assumption is false." 3
part of the test of eligibility for release. "[Tihe relevant standard [for determining
eligibility for release under California law] is not whether the person committed is no
longer legally insane, but whether he has improved to the extent that he is no longer a
danger to the health and safety of others, including himself." In re Franklin, 7 Cal.
3d 126, 145, 496 P.2d 465, 477, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 565 (1972).
26. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 134 (Me. 1971).
27. In a Congressional report discussing the enactment of D.C. CODE ANN.

§ 24-301 (1967) [the District of Columbia provision for commitment of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity] it was said that "in every case where a person had committed a crime as a result of mental disease or defect, such person shall be given a
period of hospitalization to guard against imminent recurrence of some criminal act by
that person." S. REP. No. 1170, H.R. REP. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2, 3, 16
(1955).

28. E.g., State v. Shackford, 262 A.2d 359, 366 (Me. 1970). This is necessarily
true in California under bifurcated trial procedures; see CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West
1970). The issue of acquittal by reason of insanity is raised only if the defendant is
convicted of the crime charged, or pleads guilty as charged but not guilty by reason of
insanity. See also CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016 (West 1970) which provides in part: "A
defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty,
thereby admits the commission of the offense charged." See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d
330, 349-50, 202 P.2d 53, 65 (1949).
29. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 24, at 228.
30.

Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insan-

ity, 38 TEx. L. REv. 849, 855 (1960).
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Yet Dr. Guttmacher, another noted commentator in the field,
maintains the opposite to be true: "[A] man who is in a hospital because he has committed a crime for which he has been exculpated,
is a different individual from the individual who has been sent there
as a mental case."3 1 The difference of opinion between these two commentators represents a fundamental division throughout the field of
psychiatry. 32 In light of this widespread disagreement between psychiatrists on the issue of actual dangerousness it is certainly reasonable for legislators and courts to look to the judicial determination
in a criminal proceeding that the defendant actually committed an act
which is socially proscribed, the doing of which would normally subject him to punitive sanctions, as evidence of dangerousness. This
kind of common sense psychological judgment, given the present state
of psychiatry as a science, is rightfully within the province of the criminal law. 33
Yet despite the conflict in evidence on the question of whether
such persons are dangerous, society has an even more basic interest in
distinguishing between those committed civilly and those committed
criminally. 34 That interest derives from the very nature of the insanity
defense itself and the even more basic nature of criminal responsibility. When a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, this is
much more than a factual determination. The psychiatrist testifies on
the factual issue, expressing his opinion with reference to medical
classification and terminology. But the jury decides the ultimate issue
of criminal responsibility. The jury's role is to determine whether the
defendant is so mentally diseased that he should be exempt from pun31. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 24, at 232-33 n.24 quoting from H.R. RE,. No.
892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1955) (testimony of Dr. Guttmacher) [emphasis
added].
32. See J.HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 466-69 (2d ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as HALL].
33. See id. at 469. Professor Hall, in his critical analysis of the uncertainty inherent in psychiatry as a science, asks: "If many able experts, after much study, came
to the above conclusions about current 'scientific' psychiatry, what is the lawyer, legislator or judge expected to do? Is he to say that he understands psychiatry better
than these expert critics, that they are mistaken in their appraisal of the present state
of psychiatric knowledge? Is he to accept the claim of the psychiatrist-critics of the
criminal law, that their knowledge is scientific? Or is he to appraise the various
theories from the viewpoint of common sense, experience, and compatibility with the
psychology and ethics of the criminal law? It is submitted that the last is both valid
and necessary in a democratic society."
In fact this psychiatric uncertainty in the opinions of psychiatrists is demonstrated in Franklin. See note 9 supra.
34. See Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted by Reason
of Insanity, 4 HAnv. J.LErIs. 55, 56-57 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hamann].
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ishment. 5 Thus, the factual finding that the defendant was suffering
from a mental disease or disorder is not all that is implied in an acquittal by reason of insanity. Also implied is the ethical outlook of
an entire society vis vis insanity and criminal responsibility.3 6 The
criminal law reflects not only facts such as psychiatric determinations
of state of mind; it also reflects social attitudes with regard to certain
kinds of behavior and social responsibility (moral accountability)
for that behavior. As Professor Jerome Hall has pointed out: "The
criminal trial seeks to ascertain whether the accused had the normal
competence to make a moral decision. . . ."7 The ethical view behind acquitting an insane person found to have committed a harm
which would normally subject him to criminal liability is that, having
been insane at the time he committed that harm, he lacked the requisite mens rea "and no crime was committed. Punishment presupposes
normal competence and the relevant causing (authorship) of a proscribed harm; hence there can be no question of responsibility or pun38
ishment of insane persons."1
Thus, it is not only greater potential dangerousness which serves
to distinguish a person acquitted by reason of insanity from a person
subject to civil commitment proceedings-the uniqueness of the insanity verdict is inherent in the very nature of the ethical view which
the verdict represents. The defendant has committed a harm, yet he
is subject to no punitive sanctions for the commission of that harm.
As the court said in Ragsdale v. Overholser,39 a case in which the constitutionality of the District of Columbia commitment statute was attacked:
It is hardly asking too much to require that a defendant who is
absolved from punishment by society because of his mental condition at the time of the criminal act should accept some restraint
on his liberty by confinement in a hospital for such period as
is required to determine whether he has recovered and whether
he will be dangerous if released. . . . Not without some signifi35. Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 932 (1961).

36. Professor Hall has underlined this important function of the criminal law:
"But the relationship of the criminal law to fact does not exhaust the meaning of that
branch of law. For just as the penal law denotes certain facts (the words of the rules
and doctrines are unintelligible apart from those references) so, equally, does that law
express certain ethical principles. If one is interested in the full range of criminal

theory, analysis
essential to an
32 at 26.
37. Id. at
38. Id. at
39.

of its ethical rationale is unavoidable; indeed, as will appear, that is
understanding of what the criminal law means." HALL, supra note
465.
449.

281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

State v. Shackford, 262 A.2d 359, 366 (Me.

1970): "He became one who is to be held blameless and free from punishment for an
act otherwise subject to criminal sanctions."
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cance, although by no means a controlling factor, is the fact that
appellant's assumed mental condition has led him to be held blameless and free from40 punishment for an act otherwise subject
to criminalsanctions.
Does it follow from an acquittal by reason of insanity that the
defendant is in the same position as any other defendant acquitted in
a criminal proceeding? Obviously not. 41 Where a defendant is
normally acquitted the state has failed to sustain its burden of proof
that he committed a proscribed harm. He is therefore allowed to go
free of the control of the state. Where a defendant has been acquitted
by reason of insanity he has been found guilty of the commission of
a proscribed harm.4 2 The finding of insanity implies that he is not to
be subjected to punitive sanctions, but it does not follow that he is not
to be subjected to any form of control by the state. The commitment
of persons acquitted by reason of insanity does grow out of the commission of the act charged. The individual's dangerousness to himself and the community, not his otherwise criminal conduct, is the
ground for his commitment. But it is precisely because of that harmful conduct that society is justified in concluding that he is dangerous.
Whether persons subject to civil commitment might commit offenses
is a matter of conjecture; but persons subject to criminal commitment
have done so. Their proven dangerousness justifies treating them as
a special class.4 s
In some sense, then, commitment following an acquittal by reason of insanity is a middle ground between criminal justice and civil
commitment. The defendant is not being punished-he is not being
held morally accountable for his act-but he is being temporarily
confined because he has been adjudicated, in a court of criminal justice, guilty of the commission of a socially proscribed harm. Thus,
automatic commitment of a defendant who has been acquitted by reason of insanity is properly within the realm of the criminal law, since
law is to determine who
one of the main purposes of the criminal
44
shall be subject to the control of the state.
40. Id. at 949 [emphasis added].
41. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 24, at 227-28. Professors Goldstein and
Katz seriously question the assumption that acquittal by reason of insanity "is equated
This assumption leads to the
with all other acquittals in the criminal process ....
conclusion that [such] persons . . . should be treated, so far as release procedures
are concerned, as 'bona fide innocent,'--whatever that phrase may mean. It may
mean, as [one proponent] seems to imply, that the community has no interest in the
decision of when to release a person who, though acquitted, has demonstrated an
ability, not merely a propensity, to commit dangerous acts."
42. See note 28 supra.
43. Hamann supra note 34 at 57.
44. "Substantive penal law is constructed to determine the basic questions, who
shall be subject to the control of the state, and who shall remain free of that. The
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Two factors emerge from this special interest argument; first, that
the entire field of criminal law functions by providing a normative
reflection of socially prevalent morality, ethics and common sense psychology, and second, that psychiatric evidence is far from conclusive
on the question of the relative dangerousness of those persons acquitted
by reason of insanity and those persons civilly committed. In light of
that psychiatric uncertainty it is reasonable to make the social decision that such persons are more dangerous than those not previously
found to have committed a crime.4 5 It has been judicially determined
that the defendant has displayed socially harmful conduct. He is not to
be subjected to punitive sanctions, but neither is he to be free of any
sanctions.4 6
The Strict Equal Protection Test
Although the special public interest argument does provide a rational basis for distinguishing persons committed following an acquittal by reason of insanity from persons committed civilly, that alone is
not enough to satisfy the equal protection requirement. The California Supreme Court, in the recent case of In re Gary W., 47 defined
the requirements of the equal protection clause with respect to involuntary commitment:
The necessity for a rational distinction among persons whom the
law treats differently is of particular importance in the area of involuntary commitment. Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate
purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality
. . .closer scrutiny is afforded a statute which affects fundamental
interest or employs a suspect classification . . . . In such cases
the state bears the burden of establishing both that the state
has a compelling interest which justifies the law and that the distinction is necessary to further that purpose ....
A variety of interests have been held to be so "fundamental"
as to impose this burden on the state . . . . The right to a
jury trial in an action which may lead to the involuntary confinesocial interpretation of punishment qualifies the meaning of the relevant substantive
classification-determines, that is, what kind of control shall be exercised by the state.

It assumes, therefore, that there are important differences between hospitals and
prisons ..
" HALL, supra note 32 at 462.
45. See note 33 supra.
46. It should be noted that even civil commitment is a sanction: "Commitment

procedures [whether labelled civil or criminal] constitute a sanction, so far as the
person confined is concerned, in the form of deprivation of liberty, at least to the extent that commitment is without regard to his 'wishes.' And a society free of such
sanctions is difficult to visualize. It would require that each individual be so enlightened and free that he can become aware of his dangerousness and commit himself for
the benefit of the community." Goldstein & Katz supra note 24 at 229.
47. 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
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ment of the defendant, even if such48confinement is for the purpose
of treatment, is no less fundamental.
This holding is in line with decisions of the United States Supreme Court
construing the equal protection clause to require close scrutiny of any
49
classifications which might abridge fundamental rights or liberties.
Yet despite this articulated policy of close scrutiny, and despite petitioner Franklin's calling the attention of the court to this very language of In re Gary W., 50 the court nowhere mentioned the requirement of close scrutiny."' Although the public policy of the protection
of fundamental civil liberties would seem to warrant subjecting the statute to close scrutiny, it does not seem that the portions of the statute
to which the petitioner objected could be invalidated on constitutional
grounds even under closer scrutiny. The result might differ had the
petitioner raised other issues which will be discussed later, but the petitioner only questioned the constitutional validity of commitment
prior to a hearing. 5
Under the rule of Gary W., it is not enough that a rational distinction is made. Closer scrutiny requires that the court be satisfied of
two things; first, that there is a compelling state interest which justifies the law, and second, that the distinction is necessary to further the
purpose of the law. What the court, in criminal insanity cases, calls
the special public interest,5 3 certainly qualifies as a compelling state
interest. It might even be argued that the court was merely discussing
the compelling state interest in a different guise-the special public
interest. The special public interest arises out of such fundamental
concerns-the protection of society from individuals who have demonstrated themselves dangerous and the more basic ethical evaluative
48. Id. at 306, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
49. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
50. Petitioner's Brief, Exhibit A at 35-36, In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496
P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
51. The court does discuss In re Gary W. in the context of the equal protection
argument, but only refers to its requirement that differing procedures for commitment
of various classes of people may not "deny to one such class fundamental rights or
privileges accorded to another unless a rational basis for the distinction exists." In re
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 135, 496 P.2d 465, 470, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1972),
quoting In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 304, 486 P.2d 1201, 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7
(1971).
52. The issue before the court, as framed by the petitioner in his habeas corpus
brief, was whether "[tihe due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution
require that Penal Code section 1026 be read to furnish defendant, who was acquitted
of a crime by reason of insanity, the right to a full hearing by jury, on the issue of
whether he had recovered his sanity before he may be committed to state hospital."
Petitioner's Brief, Exhibit A at 13, In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
53. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 138, 496 P.2d 465, 472, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
560 (1972).
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function of the criminal law-that is a compelling interest. Automatic commitment under section 1026 also seems to satisfy the requirement that the distinction is necessary to further the purpose
for which the distinction was made.5 4 Since the oft-stated purpose of
the statute is to protect society from potentially dangerous individuals,
that protection can best be assured only by commitment of those persons for the period of observation necessary to determine their actual
dangerousness. 55 Thus the mere fact that the petitioner is automatically
committed while persons committed civilly are afforded a hearing56
54. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 306, 486 P.2d 1201, 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9
(1971). "Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically,
but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made." Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). Although Baxstrom is relied on by the petitioner, and is discussed by many of the more
recent cases concerning criminal commitment, the California Supreme Court pointed
out in Franklin that Baxstrom reached the merits of a different issue. 7 Cal. 3d 126,
139-40, 496 P.2d 465, 472-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 560-61 (1972).
Baxstrom was
concerned with two different types of civil commitment. See note 60 infra.
55. The court states this as the objective of post-acquittal commitment prior to a
hearing: "[C]onstitutional principles do not forbid prehearing confinement for a reasonable period of persons such as petitioner for the purpose of immediate institutional
observation and examination of their mental condition." 7 Cal. 3d 126, 133, 496 P.2d
465, 468, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1972).
56. Actually even persons confined under civil commitment proceedings can be
involuntarily confined without a hearing, but it is a more limited confinement than is
commitment pursuant to California Penal Code section 1026. Under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 (formerly section 5880) any person who is a
danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder may be
taken into custody upon reasonable cause and placed in an evaluative facility under the
Act for seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation. The facility must require a written application stating the circumstances under which the person's condition came to
the attention of the facility's staff and that the officer or professional recommending
the commitment personally believes that the person sought to be committed is dangerous or gravely disabled. However, no hearing is required. In re Burhans, 65 Cal. 2d
233, 418 P.2d 1, 53 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1966). A person who has received such an evaluation may under certain conditions be certified for up to fourteen days of involuntary
intensive treatment. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5250 (West 1972). This requires
a notice of certification, signed by the person in charge of the evaluation facility and a
physician. Id. § 5251. A copy of the notice must be filed with the court, id. § 5253,
but a hearing is not yet required. At the expiration of the fourteen-day period a person may be certified for another fourteen days of treatment, but only if he has attempted or threatened to take his life and he continues to present an imminent threat
of taking his life. Id. § 5260. Otherwise the person confined is either released, or a
petition for postcertification treatment (up to ninety days) must be filed. Id. § 5300.
If that is filed the person is guaranteed a full hearing within four judicial days, or a
jury trial within ten judicial days. Id. § 5303. He has the right to an attorney.
Id. § 5302. Thus most persons civilly confined will have a hearing within twenty-one
to twenty-seven days; seventeen days involvuntary treatment, plus either four days after
the filing of a petition for postcertification treatment in the case of a non-jury hearing,
or ten days after the filing in the case of a jury hearing.
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does not deprive him of the equal protection of the laws required by
the federal Constitution. '
Here is an area where due process and equal protection considerations overlap. The denial of a hearing prior to commitment raises
both constitutional objections; thus the due process argument must be
considered before it can be said that commitment prior to a hearing is
constitutionally valid.
The Due Process Attack
In addition to equal protection considerations, Franklin had argued that his commitment under section 1026 was unconstitutional
because he had been involuntarily confined without a hearing regarding his present mental condition. He pointed out that recent due process developments on state and federal levels had cast serious doubts
on the 1930 California Supreme Court decision Ex parte Slayback, s
which first upheld the constitutionality of commitment without a hearing on present sanity under Penal Code section 1026. He relied on
the United States Supreme Court decision, Baxstrom v. Herold,59 which
held that a prisoner who had been declared dangerously insane by
a prison psychiatrist and subsequently detained in a mental institution after his sentence had expired was denied constitutional safeguards afforded others civilly committed. The Court held that there
was no rational basis for distinguishing persons in Baxstrom's class
from others civilly committed and that therefore Baxstrom was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial before he could be committed. 60
In the same year that Baxstrom was decided New York's highest
court considered a constitutional attack on the New York criminal
commitment statute0 ' which authorized commitment prior to a hearing. The same issue had been reviewed by the New York court in
57. "The equal protection clause disapproves only irrational and arbitrary classifications. The classification made by the legislature in the instant situation between
civil commitment and criminal commitment is neither irrational nor arbitrary, and, in
fact, is perfectly reasonable.
The petitioner, by establishing his mental incapacity . . . has justified the automatic commitment imposed on him. Concern for the general safety of the community
requires at least this much. Thus, the difference in procedure does not offend the constitutional provisions requiring equal protection of the law." State ex rel. Schopf v.
Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644, 651-52, 173 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1970).
58. 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930).
59. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
60. ld. at 114-15. The Baxstron decision involved an area of "overlap" in due
process and equal protection provisions. Baxstrom was denied equal protection of the
laws by the procedure whereby he was civilly committed at the expiration of his prison
sentence without the jury review available to others civilly committed. That he was
never granted a hearing on his mental condition involved the due process objection.
61. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 454 (McKinney 1958).
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1909 in People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler,62 where the court held
such commitment procedures constitutionally permissible. The more
recent case of People v. Lally63 held that the reasoning in Peabody
was still sound and that persons acquitted by reason of insanity could
constitutionally be committed prior to a hearing. 4 Nonetheless, the
Lally court chose to read into the commitment statute a provision authorizing a jury trial, if requested, prior to commitment. The court
declared that "to comply with the spirit if not the express language of
the Baxstrom . . . decision we hold that, before there can be any
commitment to the [state hospital for the criminally insane] a person
must be accorded . . . a jury trial, if requested.""
In keeping with what Franklin called the "Baxstrom-Lally approach," 66 petitioner cited Specht v. Patterson,6 7 another United States
Supreme Court decision. In Specht the defendant had been convicted
of a sex offense and under the authority of a Colorado statute,6 8 he was
subsequently declared by the court to be a "threat of bodily harm
to members of the public, or an habitual offender and mentally ill." 69
This declaration was made without affording him an opportunity for
a full hearing on the issue, thus subjecting him to incarceration for
a period in excess of that possible for the sex offense itself. In holding
this procedure to be a denial of due process, Justice Douglas said:
"The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a specified
crime the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for
commencing another proceeding under another Act to determine
whether a person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or
is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is a new finding of fact
Due pro. . . that was not an ingredient of the offense charged."7
cess required that the defendant be afforded a hearing to determine if
he did in fact constitute a threat of harm or was an habitual offender
and mentally ill. The analogy that Franklin sought to convey is clear.
The defendant in Specht had been convicted of violating one statute,
yet incarcerated under a different statute without a further finding of
fact. Since the Supreme Court held that this constituted a denial of
due process, petitioner attempted to show an analogous situation in
that he had been charged with the violation of one statute, California
62. 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (1909), aff'd 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E.
1109 (1909).
63. 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
64. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
65. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d at 35, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 660, 224 N.E.2d at 92.
66. Brief for Petitioner at 20.
67. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963).
69. Id. § 39-19-1.
70. 386 U.S. 605, 608 [emphasis added].
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Penal Code section 148.1, yet incarcerated under a different statute,
71
Penal Code section 1026, without a finding as to his present sanity. '
Franklin's argument found seemingly strong support in Bolton v.
Harris7 2 which considered the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's automatic commitment and release provisions and had found
them constitutionally inadequate. The District of Columbia statute '3
provided for automatic commitment without a hearing as to the present sanity of one acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect.
Commitment was required even though acquittal could be based on
nothing more than the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense.7 4 The Bolton court held
that the District of Columbia criminal commitment statute was constitutionally suspect because persons criminally committed were treated
radically differently from persons civilly committed and because an insanity acquittal in the District of Columbia reflects only a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's sanity in the past, thus providing no sound

inference of present insanity.7 5

However, the Franklin court rejected the argument that section
76
1026 should be held unconstitutional as a denial of due process.
71. Compare Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) with People v. Fuller,
24 N.Y.2d 292, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 248 N.E.2d 17 (1969).
72. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
73. D.C. CoDEANN. § 24-301(d) (1967).
74. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
75. Id. at 650. In Mullen the defendant had earlier been found competent to
stand trial even though suffering from a paranoid personality. The trial court, over
the objection of the defendant, who had not raised the insanity plea, rendered a verdict of n6t guilty by reason of insanity. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding the
court of appeals held that upon acquittal by reason of insanity over a defendant's objection, a new inquiry embodying the procedural safeguards of civil commitment, is
required for commitment. Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (1967).
76. 7 Cal. 3d at 131, 496 P.2d at 466, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 554. In addition to his
appeal for a pre-commitment hearing, Franklin also cited developments subsequent to
Ex parte Slayback, which undermined the support for the presumption of continuing
insanity upon which that decision had rested. Slayback had principally relied upon
three cases: In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912); People ex rel. Peabody v.
Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (1909), afrd, 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 1109
(1909), and In re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 P. 552 (1905). As has been shown,
text accompanying notes 63-65 supra, Lally modified the effect of the Peabody decision. In re Brown was rendered ineffective as far as any support for the Slayback
decision concerning commitment without a hearing by the enactment of a Washington
statute requiring the jury to consider the present sanity of the defendant before he
could be committed. WASH. Rnv. COD ANN. § 10.76.030 (1961) originally enacted
as Laws of 1907, ch. 30, § 3 at 33, this statute was enacted twenty-three years before
Slayback. Thus, of the three cases which had supported 6'layback only the Kansas
decision of In re Clark retains its original force.
As to the contention that Slayback's immediate support had been weakened, this is
no doubt correct. More recent cases and authorities, however, which have considered
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The court had a relatively simple task in distinguishing the cases relied upon by the petitioner from the situation immediately at issue.
Lally had explicitly acknowledged the constitutional validity of the
earlier Peabody decision. In fact Lally had gone so far as to suggest
that the defendant acquitted by reason of insanity be confined for observation and examination. 77 Although the Lally court read into the
New York statute a provision authorizing a jury hearing prior to commitment to the state hospital for the criminally insane, it did not do so
on constitutional grounds. It did so merely to comply with the "spirit" of Baxstrom.7 8 Additionally, as the Franklin court noted, the
legal implications of acquittal by reason of insanity under District of
Columbia law as considered by Bolton, were different from the legal
implications of an insanity acquittal in California. Since the District required only that there be a showing of a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense to obtain an acquittal,7 9 the
lack of a pre-commitment hearing would mean that a person could be
committed on the basis that there existed only a reasonable doubt as
to his past sanity. Commitment under those circumstances would
seem to offend the principle of due process. California is far more
stringent in this regard, requiring that a defendant prove he was insane
by a preponderance of the evidence.8 0 Hence, where the District read
into their statute a provision requiring a pre-commitment hearing in
order to save it from constitutional attack, it does not follow that California must adopt the same measure.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the court in Bolton stated
that, "We agree with Ragsale v. Overholser, for example, that commitment without a hearing is permissible for the period required to determine present mental condition. The jury's finding of a reasonable
doubt as to defendant's sanity at the time of the offense provides sufficient warrant for further examination."' '.
Though the court in Franklin did not discuss Specht,8 2 this case
is also distinguishable. Specht had noted that there was no provision
for judicial review of the determination that the defendant was a sex
offender as declared by the trial court. In addition, there never had
the matter of the presumption of continuing insanity have concurred with the Slayback
rationale. See, e.g., Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969); State v. Allan, 166
N.W.2d 752 (Iowa 1969). See generally Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REv. 849 (1960).
77. 19 N.Y.2d at 34, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 659, 224 N.E.2d at 91.
78. Id. at 35, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 660, 224 N.E.2d at 92.
79. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
80. People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954).
81. 395 F.2d at 651.
82. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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been a judicial determination in which the defendant had been accorded
his rights to a hearing on whether he was in fact "a threat of bodily
harm to members of the public, or. . .an habitual offender and mentally ill.""as That determination was required for commitment under
the statute in Specht. The fact that Franklin had been afforded a judicial determination as to his sanity at the time of the offense8 4 together
with the provision found in Penal Code section 1026a authorizing judicial review ninety days after commitment distinguishes Specht from
Franklin.
The court in Franklin placed strong emphasis on Chase8 5 to support its decision not to require a pre-commitment hearing. Chase, in
considering the constitutional validity of Maine's automatic commitment statute,8" noted that important policy considerations rationally
justify the commitment of a person adjudged not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect. These important policy considerations, similar to those discussed in Slayback,87 were: the defendant had voluntarily raised the issue of his sanity; the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed a criminal offense; and
the defendant had proved himself insane at the time of the offense by
a prepondernance of the evidence. Society was said to acquire a special interest in such a person requiring commitment to determine
whether further custody and treatment were needed to avoid danger to
society or himself. Since such a determination required some period
of time, it was not unreasonable to commit the person to an institution for the mentally ill during this period. Thus, security of the community could be protected while the defendant could undergo concurrent observation and examination. In conclusion, the Chase court
noted that strong policy considerations justifying immediate detention
of the individual were not alone sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of due process; there must be an adequate release remedy which
would provide the opportunity for a reasonably prompt hearing. 88
83. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 39-19-1 (1963).
84. The fact the defendant had been afforded a judicial determination and proved
himself insane is an integral part of the "special interest" argument previously considered in the context of equal protection. See text accompanying note 16 supra. This
"special interest" is again employed as justification for commitment in the due process
discussion which follows. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
85. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971).
86. 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 103 (1964).
87. It should be noted, however, that Slayback did not speak of a "special
interest" justifying commitment. Instead, the basis for commitment was that insanity
was presumed to continue from the time of the offense. Ex parte Slayback, 209
Cal. 480, 485, 288 P. 769, 771 (1930).
88. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 135 (Me. 1971); accord, Mills v. State,
256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969); State ex. rel. Schopf v. Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644, 173
N.W.2d 673 (1970).
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The Questionable Presumption of Continuing Insanity
In order to justify commitment without a hearing Chase did not
rely upon the presumption that the defendant's insanity, proved to exist at a point in the past, had continued. Instead, the court held that
"important policy considerations" together with adequate release provisions rendered Maine's commitment statute compatible with the constitutional demands of due process.8 9
Mills v. State,90 another case relied upon by the Franklin court,
employed a more conventional rationale-the presumption of continuing insanity.91 That is, since it was judicially determined that the
defendant had been insane at the time of the offense, it was not unreasonable to presume that his insanity continued, thereby justifying
immediate commitment without a hearing. Mills stated that there is
a delicate balance to be struck between society's right to be protected
from potentially mentally ill and dangerous persons and the individual's right to be protected against unjust confinement. However, Mills
held that commitment without a hearing based upon the presumption
of continuing insanity was not violative of due process.9 2 In upholding California's commitment procedure the Franklin court cited authority which relied upon the presumption of continuing insanity93 as
well as the "special interest" doctrine.94 However, the court's own
language indicates that it chose to rely on the presumption of continuing insanity as the basis for commitment without granting a hearing on the person's present mental condition.9" The fact that our
courts continue to rely on a presumption to justify depriving one of
his liberty warrants discussion as to the reasonableness of such reliance.

90

89. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 135 (Me. 1971).
90. 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969).
91. E.g., Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930).
92. Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1969).
93. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 496 P.2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
559 (1972), citing, e.g., Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752, 755-56 (Del. 1969).
94. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 138, 496 P.2d 465, 471, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
559 (1972), citing Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971). Chase had considered the presumption of continuing insanity in upholding Maine's commitment statute
but rejected it, noting that no presumption need be resorted to in order to justify commitment without a hearing on present sanity. Id. at 135.
95. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 496 P.2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562, "We agree
with Slayback and other authorities which have considered the matter, that it is reasonable to presume . . . that defendant's insanity, established by a preponderance of
the evidence, has continued to the date of trial ......
96. Since there was psychiatric testimony in Franklin of the petitioner's continued
insanity the presumption in this case may have a stronger basis than a case offering
no evidence regarding the defendant's present condition. The discussion which follows
would be more applicable where no direct evidence is presented concerning a defendant's present mental state.
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Testing the Presumption of Continuing Insanity

In assessing the reasonableness of employing the presumption of
continuing insanity the basis on which it rests should be weighed
against the importance of the affected person's interest.9 7 The more

fundamental the interest affected the more imperative it becomes that
the presumption be factually accurate. In the case of an individual
confined in a mental institution against his will, the interest jeopardized is the person's liberty. In order to protect this fundamental
interest it is essential that any presumption used as a basis for commitment have a strong basis in fact. 98 A questionable basis for presuming a thing to be true where the interest placed in jeopardy is
fundamental should lead to the conclusion that the presumption is
unreasonable. In the event a presumption may be unreasonable it
would be constitutionally suspect to employ it as the basis upon which

to justify the commitment of an individual to a mental institution. This
background should be kept in mind in analyzing the arguments in

Franklin regarding the reasonableness of the presumption of continuing insanity.
The petitioner had sought to show that the Slayback rationale
was not valid, 99 and cited more recent decisions which had not relied
upon the presumption. 100 However, those decisions were not applicable to the situation faced by the Franklin court, either because the
jurisdiction had called for a different degree of proof in establishing
insanity than does California,'"' or because the person was never afforded any judicial determination on the issue which subjected him to
incarceration.. 0 2 It follows that in these cases there never existed
an adequate basis which would have reasonably supported using a
presumption. Consequently, in each case cited by the petitioner a
jury trial was required to satisfy due process.10 3
As previously stated, the use of a presumption is unreasonable
where it has an inadequate basis. This is useful in explaining why the
97. This is the authors' suggestion. Even those jurisdictions which have rejected the presumption have not gone as far as is suggested here.
98. Justice Holmes' forceful statement, in another context, is applicable here;
"This is not a matter for polite presumptions: we must look facts in the face." Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, I., dissenting).

99. See note 76 supra.
100. E.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
101. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
103. It is unclear whether the court in Lally would have held there to be a denial
of due process had a hearing not been granted. Lally sought only to comply with the
"spirit" of Baxstrom and never spoke of a constitutional mandate necessitating a hearing prior to commitment.
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California court refused to abandon the presumption as a basis for commitment without a hearing. With the exception of Lally,10 ' none of
the cases cited by the petitioner offered a legal basis adequate to support the reasonable use of the presumption. However, in California, the burden of proof of insanity is greater and there has been a
prior judicial determination that insanity did exist at some point in the
past. Thus, the Franklin court was able to distinguish the cases cited
by the petitioner when it held that the presumption of continuing insanity was reasonable. In fact, authority from jurisdictions which have
commitment procedures similar to California offers strong support for
the Franklinposition. 10 5
Despite this strong support, if the factual basis for the presumption is examined, numerous difficulties are encountered:
It is of course impossible to predict with any sort of precision the
number of cases in which insanity will persist between any two
given points in time ....
There are . . . substantial difficulties with any presumption

of continuing insanity, even if one tentatively accepts such a presumption as valid. .

.

.

[T]he validity of the presumption will

vary considerably from case to case. Furthermore, the relevant
factor is dangerousness of the individual to self or society. If the
criminal act was a reaction to a particular stress situation unlikely to recur, there is little reason to expect the individual to be
a continuing danger to himself or others; in some situations, in fact,
the act itself may have effected a "cure" . . . . On the other

hand, many types of personality disorders may be difficult or impossible to cure. .

.

. The point is not that the presumption is

necessarily invalid, but rather that the variation from case to
case is so large as to make a general presumption of little worth.'
At first glance it appears that a California court could successfully counter these objections by pointing to the fact that California's
commitment statute enables a judge to release the defendant if "it shall
appear to the court that the defendant has fully recovered his san1
ity.'

°7

Thus the judge theoretically can weigh the merits of each

case and is not bound to apply the presumption. However, as pointed
out in In re Jones,1 8 it is hardly realistic to expect a defendant who
is trying to prove his past insanity to introduce evidence that he is
presently sane, especially since his present sanity is not in issue. 10
It seems obvious that in trying to convince a judge or jury that he was
104. 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 224 N.E.2d 87 (1966).
105. See note 76 supra.
106. Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the
Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 924, 935 (1968).
107. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
108. 260 Cal. App. 2d 906, 68 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1968).
109. Id. at 911 n.3, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 36 n.3.
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insane at the time of the offense a defendant would jeopardize his case
by introducing evidence that he is presently sane. One commentator
noted that although a presumption of continuing insanity is ab initia
suspect, a presumption of continuing dangerousness is not unreasonable. He nonetheless concluded: "The most substantial reason for not
requiring a hearing prior to commitment is the need for observation.",1 0
In light of these comments it should be realized that a presumption of continuing insanity may not always be "reasonable." It
would seem that jurisdictions which rely solely upon this presumption
to justify commitment without hearing would find themselves at a
loss when challenged on constitutional grounds."' A more substantial rationale justifying commitment without requiring a hearing is
the "special interest" doctrine employed by the Chase court."12 Such
a doctrine does not base commitment on a rationale as weak as the
presumption of continuing insanity. Since the loss of a person's liberty is at stake, only the strongest of reasons should justify commitment. The special public interest is compelling in its strength. No
sound reason exists why our courts should continue to use the presumption as a basis for justifying commitment without a hearing on a person's present mental condition. However, a strong basis for commitment without a hearing on present sanity exists in the special interest doctrine, which gives society the right to require commitment prior
to a hearing in order to protect itself and the individual whenever
the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity." 3 "In effect,
the defendant, by raising the defense of insanity . . . postpones a determination of his present mental health and acknowledges the right
of the state, upon accepting his plea, to detain him for diagnosis, care,
and custody in a mental institution until certain specified conditions
are met.""' 4
Although Franklin in his petition cited cases requiring a hearing prior to commitment, 115 upon critical examination it has been
shown that due process does not require such a hearing. 1 6 Because
110. Hamann, supra note 34 at 63-65.
111. "Presumptions . . . may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the
twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Mackowik v. Kansas City,
St. J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906).
112. 278 A.2d 132, 135 (Me. 1971).
113. See id.
114. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 24 at 230.
115. E.g. Petitioner's Brief at 17, citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966);
Petitioner's Brief at 19, citing People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.
2d 654 (1966); Petitioner's Brief at 24, citing Bolton v. Harris,395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
116. See text accompanying notes 58-81 supra.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

of the special interest which the public acquires in the confinement
and release of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity, their commitment prior to a hearing for the period of time reasonably necessary
to determine their present sanity does not violate due process requirements if adequate release provisions are available.
Statutory Provisions for ReleaseThe Initial Hearing
While prehearing commitment itself may pose no constitutional
problems, there must be adequate provisions for release. In fact
the court's conclusion that commitment under Penal Code section 1026
is constitutionally valid is premised on the existence of a reasonable
opportunity to seek release. 11 7 Thus the Franklin court, faced with
the issue of the validity of initial commitment, was compelled to discuss release provisions.
The court noted that both the petitioner and the People agreed
that the standard to be applied in any hearing for release under section 1026a is neither the M'Naghten test, nor whether the patient is
legally insane, but whether he has improved to the extent that he is
18
no longer dangerous to the health and safety of himself or others."
This is substantially similar to the test applied to determine the eligibility for release of persons civilly committed as imminently dangerous. 1 9 Because of this similarlity, there seems to be no argument
concerning equal protection as to the standard for release. 2 '
117. "[O]ur premise throughout this opinion has been that California's initial
commitment procedures are valid only because the person committed has a reasonable

opportunity to obtain his release."

In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 145, 496 P.2d 465,

477, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 565 (1972).
118. Id.
119. CAL. WELF.& INST'NS CODE §§ 5150-5300 (West 1972). See note 56 supra.
The distinction drawn, in this and other analyses, between "civil" commitment and
"criminal" commitment is deceiving in one respect-it superficially implies that there is
one set of procedures labelled "civil" commitment. The law is more discriminating.
Generally included in the category of "civil" commitment procedures under the Welfare
and Institutions Code are procedures for the confinement and treatment of imminently dangerous persons, id. § 5300, gravely disabled persons, id. § 5150, mentally
disordered sex offenders, id. § 6316, and narcotic addicts, id. § 3050. Of those classes
of persons subject to commitment, those committed as imminently dangerous persons
are probably in the position which is most closely related to those committed under
Penal Code section 1026. Both are confined because of dangerousness to themselves
and others.
120. Although this standard has no equal protection defect, it may be seriously
defective in other respects. The standard for release might be interpreted such that a
person whose sanity is completely restored still may be confined, even though he will

no longer benefit from care and treatment, because of criminal tendencies which render
him 'dangerous.' Professors Goldstein and Katz have noted the problem: "Mhe
question arises: what disposition is to be made of those acquitted by reason of insanity
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1 21
The Franklin court, following the recent trend in authority,
concluded that requiring the petitioner to prove his readiness for release by a preponderance of the evidence was not a denial of equal
protection; 22 even though persons civilly committed must sustain no
such burden.123 The petitioner is a member of an exceptional class
since he has proved his own insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. This resulted in his being held free from punishment for an
act otherwise punishable, thus justifying the evidentiary burden placed
upon him.' 24 That burden is another measure of the greater preby reason of
cautions surrounding the handling of persons acquitted125
insanity, in order that the public interest may be protected.
However, one serious constitutional question, not discussed by the
court, 126 is the question of how soon a hearing must be held to determine eligibility for release.' 27 The court stated: "Nothing in section 1026a prevents either the hospital or the patient from applying, qt
any time, for his release; to minimize the possibility of error, how-

who remain dangerous-whatever meaning will be given to that word-but who have 'recovered sanity' at least to the extent that they could no longer be held had they been
civilly committed? Continued detention would be the statutory answer. But to hold a
patient solely for potential dangerousness would snap the thin line between detention
for therapy and detention for retribution .... Not to release such persons would in
effect be to equate an undefined 'dangerousness' with an undefined mental illness...
there can be no such equation." Goldstein & Katz, supra note 24, at 237-38.
121. See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mills v.
State, 256 A.2d 752, 758 (Del. 1968).
122. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 148, 496 P.2d 465, 479, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553,
567 (1972).
123. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE § 5300 (West 1972).
124. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 146-47, 496 P.2d 465, 477-78, 101 Cal. Rptr.
553, 565-66 (1972); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 137-38 (Me. 1971).
125. There is even some psychiatric agreement that persons 'criminally' committed must be treated with greater caution than those civilly committed: "In the case of
persons who have been arrested, particularly if charged with serious offenses, a
greater degree of conservatism must be practised in the matter of release, in consideration of attitudes of the public." Overholser, The Present Status of Problems of Release
of Patientsfrom Mental Hospitals, 29 PSYCHIATiC QUARTFPLY 372-80 (1955) quoted in
Goldstein and Katz supra note 24, at 232.
126. Although the court does discuss the reasonableness of the ninety-day limitation in constitutional terms, see In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 143-44, 496 P.2d 465,
476, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 564 (1972), it does not discuss the specific objection here
raised as to the inflexibility of the limitation. The court merely upholds the provision
against the petitioner's contention that a hearing prior to commitment is required.
As has already been pointed out, this is not required. See text accompanying notes
55-57 supra.
127. This question was not considered in In re Boyd, 108 Cal. App. 541, 291
P. 845 (1930), where the court held that sections 1026 and 1026a of the Penal Code
satisfied equal protection requirements. The case however, was one in which a defendant had been found sane and sought release from the state penitentiary by attacking
sections 1026 and 1026a.
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ever, no hearing may be held on such application until the patient
has been under observation for ninety days." 128 The articulated rationale behind the period of prehearing confinement is to provide a
period of observation sufficient to allow1 29the person's present mental
state and dangerousness to be determined.
The court recognized that: "[C]onstitutional principles do not
prohibit the automatic commitment of a person acquitted by reason of
insanity, so long as the prehearing commitment period extends no
longer than reasonably necessary for institutional examination of his
mental condition, and thereafter reasonable opportunity is provided
for a full hearing on the question whether he should be released to society." 13 0 The court determined that the ninety-day period of prehearing confinement" 3 ' was reasonable and therefore constitutional
principles were not offended. In making this determination the
Franklin court cited the Model Penal Code as proposing a six month
period prior to holding a hearing'
and noted that Slayback had upheld the validity of a one year period before a hearing was required." 3
Slayback had stated that while a "lesser or greater time [might] serve
the same purpose" it was for the legislature and not the courts to judge
the time required. 34 Thus, the Franklin court concluded that it was
evident that a ninety-day period was within the "range of permissible
choices"
available to the legislature in formulating a release provi5
sion.

13

128. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 143, 496 P.2d 465, 475, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 563
(1972).
129. Id. at 135, 496 P.2d at 469, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
130. Id. [emphasis added].
131. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026a (West 1970). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
132. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 143, 496 P.2d 465, 475, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 563, citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
133. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 143, 496 P.2d 465, 475, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 563. At the time
Slayback was decided in 1930, section 1026a called for a one year period before a hearing was held. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1766, § I at 3160 amended section 1026a, reducing the period of prehearing confinement to ninety days.
134. 209 Cal. 480, 491, 288 P. 769, 774 (1930).
135. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 143, 496 P.2d 465, 476, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 564. In addition
to Slayback and the MODEL PENAL CODE, the Franklin court cited a survey conducted
among a number of hospital superintendents as support for the reasonableness of the
ninety-day period in section 1026a. Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following
a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 409, 466 (Table C) (1961). The
survey reflected substantial differences in opinion about the time necessary to observe
and examine a person for an accurate diagnosis of his condition. Though only eleven
responses were recorded, three noticeable time periods were recommended. One group
of superintendents said a few weeks was required; another group thought it would take
about one month; and, a third felt it would take about three months. Obviously, there
was little consensus other than that some time was required to adequately observe and
examine a person for an accurate diagnosis.
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The fact that there is so much on-going debate in the field of
psychiatry regarding mental illness and the concept of dangerousness 1 6 indicates that psychiatric opinions would differ considerably
concerning the period of observation necessary to determine a person's
mental condition. 1s 7 Consequently, even though the court said that
our legislature had chosen a period of observation within the range of
permissible choices, the choice must be considered against the background of the present state of psychiatry and the lack of consensus in
denfining such a range.
In declaring that a person committed after an acquittal by reason
of insanity shall not be allowed a hearing until the passage of ninety
days, the statute sounds more concerned with punishment than with the
protection of society and the individual. Yet the court specifically
stated, "[A]s indicated in Slayback, the purpose of prehearing confinement is not to punish the defendant but to protect him and the
general public during the period necessary to appraise his present sanity."'' 38 If the policy of absolving persons acquitted by reason of insanity from punishment is to be given effect, how can an absolute period of confinement be justified?
Individual cases will not all fit the statistical norm, and, as Professor Hall pointed out: "Within the rule of law there can and should be
a substantial measure of individualization."' 13
Confinement beyond
the period which is necessary to actually determine a person's present
mental state and dangerousness, merely to minimize error, 14 0 is simply legal overkill. The community, in the form of the court or jury,
not the psychiatrist, is the final judge of the applicant's readiness for
release-it will have the public interest in mind and it must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant seeking
release is no longer dangerous to himself or others. This will more
than adequately minimize error.
To the extent that section 1026a would deny a hearing to an individual after sufficient time has elapsed to make an accurate diagnosis of his condition, the section is violative of constitutional standards. By not affording an individual a hearing immediately after the
necessary time for the appraisal of his present mental condition has
passed, section 1026a is violative of due process and tantamount to
punishment.
The person civilly committed for ninety days as imminently dan136. See Goldstein and Katz, note 24 supra & text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
137. See note 135 supra.
138. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 136, 496 P.2d 465, 470, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1972).
139. HALL, supra note 32 at 463.
140. See text accompanying notes 127-128 supra.
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gerous' 4 ' may be released any time "when, in the opinion of the superintendent or professional person in charge, the person being involuntarily treated no longer constitutes an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others."'1 4 2 Since in cases of criminal commitment this is a social as well as a medical question, 43 it is not contended that the psychiatrist should be the sole judge of readiness for
release. However, it seems that the greater opportunity for release given
to a person civilly committed is a denial of equal protection. The
equal protection guaranty requires not only a rational basis for distinguishing the two classes, but also that the difference in treatment
further the purpose of that distinction.' 44 The purpose of initial commitment prior to a hearing is to protect society from persons who have
demonstrated their dangerousness by committing a socially proscribed
harm while their present dangerousness is being determined.'
Commitment longer than is necessary to make that determination does nothing to further that purpose. Thus, release provisions should provide that the hospital superintendent's application be the appropriate grounds for granting a hearing at any time after commitment.' 4 6
He is not interested in seeking premature release: "The hospital superintendent would presumably file an application for release only
when in his opinion the patient had recovered his sanity."' 47 If persons civilly committed as imminently dangerous may be released at any
time by the hospital superintendent, equal protection principles would
demand that the hospital superintendent be able to apply to the court
for the release of the person criminally committed.
A Proposed Alternative to Section 1026a
It is submitted that a less restrictive alternative than section 1026a
should be adopted-one that would provide better safeguards for
the individual's liberty while insuring society the right to be free from
potentially mentally ill and dangerous persons. That a ninety-day
period of observation is within an acceptable range of permissible
141. See note 56 supra.
142. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5305 (West 1972).
143. "In a democratic society, we believe, the function of delimiting dangerousness
for release purposes belongs to the community. Translating community values and
policies into an operational definition of dangerousness has been assigned initially to
legislators and then to judges as construers of legislative determinations, and not to any
particular administrative or professional group, including psychiatrists." Goldstein and
Katz, supra note 24 at 230. Cf. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
144. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
145. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
146. This is in line with MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962), which places a time limit only on hearings sought by the patient, not on hearings sought by the hospital superintendent. See text accompanying note 148 inf ra.
147. 34 Op. CAL. ATT'Y. GEN. 64, 66 (1959).
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choices is not disputed. However, there is no reason why a statute
could not be sufficiently flexible to protect those individuals who, for
some reason, do not require the full period for observation and examination before an accurate diagnosis can be made. In order to protect those individuals the following is suggested:
If, at any time during the period of ninety days after a patient
has been committed following an acquittal by reason of insanity, the
superintendent is of the opinion that the patient's condition can be diagnosed he shall apply to the court for a hearing on the patient's present mental condition. Upon receiving such application the court shall
immediately grant a hearing to determine whether the patient presently constitutes a danger to himself or others due to his mental condition. In no instance shall a patient be required to undergo a period of confinement in excess of ninety days without opportunity for a
hearing concerning his present mental condition.' 4 This procedure
would provide society with the security it rightfully demands while
furnishing the individual confined in a mental institution greater safeguards for his liberty.
Statutory Provisions for ReleaseSubsequent Hearings
Section 1026a also states that "[ilf the finding of the court be adverse to releasing such person upon his application for release, on
the ground that his sanity has not been restored, he shall not be permitted to file a further application until one year has elapsed from
the date of hearing upon his last preceding application."' 14 9 This
raises an issue collateral to the court's decision in Franklin. What
remedies are available to the patient should he regain his sanity sometime during the one year period?
Though the statute expressly states that the patient shall not be
permitted to file further applications until the end of the one year
period, it does not expressly preclude the superintendent from making
further application should he believe the patient has regained his sanity. Indeed, the statute has been interpreted to mean just that. 50
The one year period pertains only to those applications that might
be submitted by the patient. However, under the current statutory provisions, the patient is without recourse even if he has evidence that he
148. Compare this with CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE §§ 5172 and 5254 (West
1972) (civil commitment procedures) and the proposed statute in Hamann supra
note 34 at 96-100 (Appendix B). Both the civil commitment provisions and the
model statute proposed by Hamann permit the early release of persons who can demonstrate eligibility for release.
149. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026a (West 1970).
150. 34 Op. CAL. AirT'. GEN. 64 (1959).
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has regained his sanity, unless the superintendent applies for a hearing. If the patient does in fact have evidence of a significant change
in his condition he should be able to present it to a court for a judicial
determination whether he remains a danger to himself of society, regardless of whether the superintendent has applied for a hearing. The
statute should be amended to incorporate a provision allowing the patient, his legal representative, a friend or relative, to make application
to the court at any time within the one year period for a hearing on
whether the patient remains a source of danger.'
In order to protect the courts from nuisance applications, the applicant should be required to present evidence of a significant change in the patient's condition before a hearing need be granted. This procedure would protect
the patient from having to undergo unjust detention when he has
evidence of a significant change in his condition which would support
a conclusion contrary to the superintendent's opinion.
The statutory provisions suggested above should adequately protect both the patient and the public. But until such procedures are
adopted, it is suggested that habeas corpus should be an available
remedy.
Availability of Habeas Corpus as a
Means of Release
Section 1026a now provides an inadequate means for obtaining
release, both during the period of prehearing confinement and the oneyear period following a hearing. Therefore if a patient has regained
his sanity and is no longer a danger to himself or others, habeas
corpus should be available as an alternative means for seeking release.
However, Slayback152 and In re Merwin, 1 3 decided on the same
day as Slayback, held that recovery of the sanity of the patient was
not sufficient ground for release until one year had elapsed.'
The
statutory provision was held to have been a complete answer to the
writ. Slayback went on to say that such a procedure should not be
regarded as punishment of the person committed since the state had
a duty to protect both the individual confined and the public.'
Traditionally, habeas corpus has been used as an extraordinary
measure and the issuance of the writ has been precluded by the ex151. Compare the procedure suggested above with the model statute proposed in
Hamann, supra note 34 at 96-100 (Appendix B).
152. Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930).
153. 209 Cal. 786, 288 P. 774 (1930).
154. Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 491-92, 288 P. 769, 774 (1930); Ex parte
Merwin, 209 Cal. 786, 787, 288 P. 773 (1930).
Note that at the time of Slayback,
a one year period prior to the initial hearing was in effect. See note 133 supra.
155. Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 491, 288 P. 769, 774 (1930).
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istence of alternative remedies.' 5 6 However, the existence of an alternative remedy precluding the issuance of a writ is premised upon the
assumption that such remedy be constitutionally adequate. An unconsitutional statute under1 7 which a petitioner is held can be tested
by a writ of habeas corpus. 1
As indicated above,' 5 8 section 1026a is overly broad and thus violative of constitutional principles, and to the extent the statute is an inadequate remedy, habeas corpus should be available to test a patient's
present condition. 5 9 This applies to the ninety-day prehearing confinement as well as the one year period after an initial hearing.
Both before and after any hearing on a patient's present condition, fundamental rights are involved. Every reasonable effort should
be made to obtain that system which will provide adequate safeguards
for those rights while insuring protection to society against mentally ill and dangerous persons. Section 1026a does not reflect such
a system and until necessary changes are adopted, habeas corpus
should not be precluded by the existence of an inadequate statutory
remedy.
Proposals herein suggested do not diminish society's security
in the least. They do afford better safeguards for the rights of individuals criminally committed to mental hospitals. Lest we forget:
"Incarceration, whether called hospitalization or by [any] other euphemism, means depriving a person of liberty. No matter how sweetly
disguised or delicate the language, involuntary confinement is a
loss of freedom."' 60
Conclusion
Because the public has a special interest in the confinement and
release of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity, his initial confinement prior to a hearing-in order to protect society from individuals found to have been dangerous and to determine the defendant's present mental state and dangerousness-is not violative of either
equal protection or due process requirements, provided that such individuals are given a constitutionally sufficient means of seeking their
156. E.g., Ex parte Alpine, 203 Cal. 731, 739, 265 P. 947, 950 (1928): "The
writ of habeas corpus may not be invoked where the accused has such a remedy under
the orderly provisions of a statute designed to rule the specific case upon which he relies for his discharge."
157. E.g., In re Peterson, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958).
158. See text accompanying notes 117-151 supra.
159. Cf. State ex rel. Schopf v. Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644, 654, 173 N.W.2d 673,
678 (1970), where the court held that to the extent their statute denied the writ it was
unconstitutional.
160. In re Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912, 913, 171 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1957).
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release. The "present dangerousness to health and safety" test for release, and the imposition upon the defendant of the burden of proving his readiness for release by a preponderance of the evidence are
also consistent with due process and equal protection principles. However, the inflexibility of the time limitation and the possible foreclosure of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy in cases where the
defendant has become sane or where he has been accurately diagnosed without need of the full ninety-day period are constitutional
defects in the statutory scheme and should be remedied by appropriate judicial and legislative action.
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